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An evolutionary model explaining the
Neolithic transition from egalitarianism
to leadership and despotism
Simon T. Powers and Laurent Lehmann
Department of Ecology and Evolution, University of Lausanne, 1015 Lausanne, Switzerland
The Neolithic was marked by a transition from small and relatively egalita-
rian groups to much larger groups with increased stratification. But, the
dynamics of this remain poorly understood. It is hard to see how despotism
can arise without coercion, yet coercion could not easily have occurred
in an egalitarian setting. Using a quantitative model of evolution in a patch-
structured population, we demonstrate that the interaction between
demographic and ecological factors can overcome this conundrum. We model
the coevolution of individual preferences for hierarchy alongside the degree of
despotism of leaders, and the dispersal preferences of followers. We show that
voluntary leadershipwithout coercion can evolve in small groups,when leaders
help to solve coordination problems related to resource production.An example
is coordinating construction of an irrigation system.Ourmodel predicts that the
transition to larger despotic groups will then occur when: (i) surplus resources
lead to demographic expansion of groups, removing the viability of an acepha-
lous niche in the same area and so locking individuals into hierarchy; (ii) high
dispersal costs limit followers’ ability to escape a despot. Empirical evidence
suggests that these conditions were probably met, for the first time, during the
subsistence intensification of the Neolithic.
1. Introduction
Understanding how leadership and dominance behaviours in humans have
changed over evolutionary time is relevant to both biology and the social
sciences. What drove the transition from largely egalitarian hunter–gatherer
groups, where leadership was facultative and dominance attenuated [1], to
the hereditary and more despotic forms of leadership that arose during the
Neolithic [2,3]?
On the one hand, ‘coercive’ (or ‘agency’) theories have focused on the devel-
opment of inequality that was made possible with the origin of food storage
and agriculture, allowing dominant individuals to build up resource surpluses
that could be used to consolidate their power [4–6]. On the other hand, ‘func-
tional’ (or ‘integrative’) theories have addressed the benefits that leaders
provide to other group members. In particular, as human group size increased
during the Neolithic [7,8], the resulting scalar stress [9] would have necessita-
ted increased hierarchy in order to solve various coordination and collective
action problems [10–16]. Leadership could have been favoured to solve pro-
blems, including the coordinated harvesting of marine resources [17–19], the
construction of irrigation systems [20–23] and defensive warfare [24,25].
But when considered alone as competing theories, both coercive and func-
tional models struggle to explain the transition to despotism seen during the
Neolithic. Purely coercive theories cannot explain why individuals would
initially choose to follow a despot [16,26]. Boehm [1] presents evidence
suggesting that present-day hunter–gatherers actively form coalitions to sup-
press would-be dominants, and argues that prehistoric hunter–gatherers did
likewise. Moreover, the advent of projectile weapons is likely to have made
such coalitions particularly effective [27], tipping the balance of power away
from an individual dominant. Thus, the question is, why would individuals
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not continue to prevent despotic behaviour? But if individ-
uals are unconstrained in their choice of leader, then it is
difficult to see how despotism could develop.
Several authors have argued that an adequate model
of the origin of increased social stratification must incorpo-
rate both functional and coercive aspects [15,22,28]. There is
evidence that aspiring leaders drove the development of tech-
nology that increased subsistence intensification and raised
population carrying capacity [17,22]. For example, construc-
tion of irrigation systems would have allowed more land to
be used for agriculture, providing an incentive for individ-
uals to follow the leader. This fits with functional theories.
On the other hand, the surplus resources that this provi-
ded could then be appropriated by leaders to further their
own ends and consolidate their power. This is particularly
the case given that irrigation farmers would be tied to the
system, making dispersal away from a despot difficult.
Spencer [22] developed a verbal model of this for the case
of irrigation systems in prehispanic Mexico, and warfare in
prehispanic Venezuela. However, the feedbacks between
population size, functional aspects of leadership and the
development of despotism remain poorly understood and
are difficult to capture with verbal models.
Here, we present an evolutionary model of the dynamics
of the transition from small-scale egalitarian to larger-scale
hierarchical groups, which integrates both functional and
coercive aspects of leadership. We use a demographically
explicit model of a patch-structured population, in which
surplus resources translate into increased reproductive
output for those who receive them, as has been common
throughout human history [29,30]. Unlike previous work,
this allows us to capture the ecological and demographic
interactions between subsistence intensification, dispersal
costs and the evolution of despotic behaviour.
2. The model
(a) Life cycle and social traits
We consider a population that is subdivided into a finite
number, Np, of patches, which are subjected to local sto-
chastic demography (as per [31,32]). The life cycle consists of
discrete and non-overlapping generations, as follows:
(i) social interactions occur on each patch with its members
possibly choosing a leader, who may affect local resource
production; (ii) each individual on a patch has a Poisson-
distributed number of offspring, with the mean determined
by the outcome of social interactions and local resource
abundance (defined explicitly below); (iii) adults of the
previous generation perish; and (iv) individuals of the descen-
dant generation may disperse, conditional on the result of the
stage of social interactions. Dispersing individuals suffer a cost
CD, such that individuals survive dispersal with probability
12 CD, and then enter a patch taken at random from the
population (excluding the natal patch).
Each individual in this population carries a cultural trait,
h. This takes the value 0 or 1, and determines whether the
carrier has a preference for hierarchy (h ¼ 1) or acephalous
(h ¼ 0) social organization. In each generation and for each
patch, one individual is chosen at random from the subset
of individuals with a preference for hierarchy (h ¼ 1) to act
as the leader (this could be an individual with unusual
characteristics such as strong organizational abilities). There
are then up to three classes of individuals on a patch:
(i) the individual chosen as the leader (l class); (ii) the remain-
ing individuals with (h ¼ 1) that act as followers ( f class); and
(iii) acephalous individuals (with h ¼ 0) that choose not to
have a leader (a class).
When in the role of a leader, an individual is assumed to
express a culturally inherited trait, z, which represents the
proportion of the surplus it generated that it keeps for
itself. This is a continuous variable between 0 and 1. Offspring
of the leader are assumed to remain philopatric, but offspring
of followers or acephalous individuals may disperse. We
denote by df the conditional dispersal strategy of the off-
spring of a follower. Specifically, df is the maximum
proportion of the surplus that an individual will tolerate
the leader of the parental generation taking, and is thus con-
tinuous between 0 and 1. This assumption accords with
evidence from social psychology that individuals tend to dis-
perse from groups with autocratic leaders [33]. Finally, da
determines the unconditional dispersal probability of the off-
spring of an acephalous individual, which is independent of
the outcome of social interactions. The assumption that the
offspring of a leader remain philopatric is appropriate in
this model, because by remaining philopatric, they increase
the probability that one of their lineage will be chosen as
leader on that patch in the next generation. Moreover,
because offspring inherit the z trait of their parent, it is less
biologically realistic that an individual would disperse
based on how much of the surplus their parent took, when
they themselves would take the same amount. We have, how-
ever, also investigated the effects of relaxing the assumption
that the offspring of a leader must remain philopatric
(electronic supplementary material, appendix S3).
Each individual carries all four cultural traits (h, z, df
and da) which are all assumed to be transmitted vertically
from parent to offspring [34] with independent probability
12 m. When a mutation occurs at trait h (probability m), an
offspring adopts the opposite trait. When a mutation occurs
at the three remaining continuous traits, Gaussian mutation
is performed by addition of a truncated Gaussian-distributed
random variable centred around the current trait value, with
variance 0.1.
Our model aims to capture qualitative behavioural trends.
A more quantitatively accurate model would include individ-
ual and social learning of behavioural traits within a
generation. For example, hierarchy preference could be a con-
tinuous trait updated by an individual’s estimate of the likely
pay-off from following a leader, and from copying the behav-
iour of more successful individuals. However, these processes
would largely result in the same qualitative outcome as the
vertical transmission with differential reproduction that we
model, apart from the fact that they operate on a much
shorter timescale.
(b) Reproduction
The mean number of offspring produced (of the Poisson
distribution in stage two of the life cycle) by individuals
within patches is assumed to follow a Beverton–Holt
model, with two niches [31,35]. The two niches correspond
to either having a leader (individuals of the l and f classes),
which we refer to as the hierarchical niche H, or remaining
acephalous (acephalous niche A, containing individuals of
class a). The degree of competition between the niches is set
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by two parameters, aAH and aHA, which represent the per
capita effects of individuals in the hierarchical niche on
those in the acephalous niche, and vice versa, respectively.
The total number of individuals in the hierarchical niche
(leader plus followers) on patch j at time t is denoted by
nHj(t), and the number of individuals in the acephalous
niche by nAj(t).
According to these assumptions, we write the mean
number of offspring produced, respectively, by a leader,
a follower and an acephalous individual on patch j at time
t as
wlj(t) ¼
rlj(t)
1þ nHj(t)=KHj(t)þ aHAnAj(t) ,
wfj(t) ¼ rb1þ nHj(t)=KHj(t)þ aHAnAj(t)
and waj(t) ¼ rb1þ nAj(t)=KAj(t)þ aAHnHj(t) :
9>>>>>=>>>>>;
(2:1)
The numerator in each expression can be thought of as the
maximal birth rate of an individual in the corresponding
class. For followers and acephalous individuals, this is given
by a constant rb, whereas for the leader, this depends upon
the outcome of surplus production, as defined below. The
denominator in each expression can be thought of as the inten-
sity of density-dependent competition. This depends on a
time-dependent variable Kij(t), which is a proxy for the carry-
ing capacity of niche i on patch j (maximum population size).
The exact carrying capacity in the Beverton–Holt model is a
function of all fitness parameters, but increases directly with
the K variable for each niche. In the classical one niche deter-
ministic case, K gives the carrying capacity when rb ¼ 2, which
is a value we use throughout. Hence, we refer (loosely)
to K as the ‘carrying capacity’. Kij(t) is affected by surplus
resource production (detailed below), which allows for local
demographic expansions owing to social interactions [31,32].
(c) Surplus production
In each patch, individuals take part in a social enterprisewhich
may generate surplus resources for their niche. Individuals
may also fail to produce this surplus, and to capture these
two cases in a probabilistic way, we let
ftj(t) ¼
1 with probability s(ntj(t), gt)
0 otherwise,
,
(
where ftj(t) is the indicator random variable taking the
value one if the surplus is produced in niche t [ {A, H} on
patch j at time t, zero otherwise. Surplus production occurs
with probability
s(ntj(t), gt) ¼ exp (#gtntj(t)), (2:2)
where gt is a parameter giving the gradient of how the prob-
ability of surplus generation changes with the number of
individuals in the niche (‘social group size’). We assume that
gt is positive, such that the probability of success decreases
with increasing social group size. This represents the effects
of scalar stress. We further assume that gH, gA, such that
the success probability declines at a slower ratewith increasing
group size in the presence of a leader, and that for a given
group size, groups with a leader are more likely to generate
the surplus.
(i) How surplus affects acephalous individuals
We relate surplus production to the ‘carrying capacity’ of
acephalous individuals by assuming that
KAj(t) ¼ Kb þ fAj(t)bk(1# exp [#gknAj(t)])
þ [1# fAj(t)](1# e)(KAj(t# 1)# Kb),
(2:3)
where Kb is the baseline capacity. If the surplus is generated,
then this is then increased by bk(12 exp[2gknAj(t)]), which is
a positive concave function of gknAj (entailing diminishing
returns), where gk sets the gradient of the carrying capacity
increase, and nAj is taken as the amount of surplus resource
produced. Alternatively, the surplus can be thought of as pro-
portional to population size, with conversion factor gk (this is
assumed to hold for both niches). The parameter bk sets
the maximum possible increase in carrying capacity. If the
surplus is not successfully generated, the carrying capacity
is then given by eKb þ (1# e)KAj(t# 1), where e is the
surplus decay rate from one generation to the next, and
KAj(0) ¼ Kb (if e , 1, there is some ecological inheritance of
modified carrying capacity).
(ii) How surplus affects leaders and followers
For individuals in the hierarchical niche, the leader keeps a
proportion of any surplus for itself, as given by the value
of its z-trait. Let zlj(t) denote the z-trait of the leader on
patch j at time t, then the carrying capacity of individuals
in the hierarchical niche is given by an analogous expression
to that of acephalous individuals (equation (2.3)), namely
KHj(t) ¼ Kb þ fHj(t)bk(1# exp [#gk{1# zHj(t)}nHj(t)])
þ (1# fHj(t))(1# e)[KHj(t# 1)# Kb],
(2:4)
where f12 zHj(t)gnHj(t) is the amount of surplus used to
increase the carrying capacity of the leader and its followers.
The remainder zlj(t)nHj(t) of the surplus is retained by the
leader and used to increase its own birth rate (which has
occurred throughout human history [29,30]) as follows:
rlj(t) ¼ rb þ fHj(t)br(1# exp [#grzlj(t)nHj(t)]), (2:5)
where gr gives the gradient of the increase in birth rate with
respect to the absolute magnitude of the surplus that the
leader takes. The parameter br gives the maximal possible
increase in the leader’s birth rate. This represents the maxi-
mum degree of despotism that it is possible for a leader to
exert. This will depend upon both ecological and social fac-
tors, and in particular, on the degree to which followers are
able to resist coercion. Where followers have little power to
resist the leader, then we would expect a large value of br.
Conversely, if followers are able to resist coercion to a large
degree, for example by forming coalitions, then a smaller
value of br would be more plausible.
(d) Conditional dispersal of followers
To close the model, it only remains to specify how offspring
of followers disperse conditionally on leader behaviour (off-
spring of acephalous individuals disperse unconditionally,
and the offspring of the leader remain philopatric). Denoting
by df,ij(t) the dispersal preference of follower offspring i on
patch j at time t, that offspring is assumed to disperse if
zlj(t) . df,ij(t),
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that is, if the leader of its parent took more than its
threshold value.
The model defines a stochastic process for the four evolv-
ing traits (h, z, da, df ), the number of individuals in each niche
(nA, nH), and their respective carrying capacities (KA, KH).
Because of the nonlinearities of the model, which result from
the interactions of all of these variables, we analyse it using
individual-based simulations.
3. Results
We focus on the effect that the following demographic and
ecological parameters have on the transition to despotism:
(i) the effect that a leader has on surplus generation (gA rela-
tive to gH); (ii) the degree to which surplus resources produce
demographic expansion (bk); and (iii) the cost of dispersal
(CD). The other parameters used in the simulations, unless
otherwise specified, are Kb ¼ 20, rb ¼ 2, gk ¼ 0.05, gr ¼ 0.1,
gH ¼ 0.01, aAH ¼ aHA ¼ 0.03, e ¼ 0:1, m ¼ 0.01, Np ¼ 50.
(a) The voluntary creation of hierarchy through cultural
evolution
Figure 1a,c illustrates that when leaders confer a large advan-
tage in surplus generation (gA is large relative to gH),
hierarchical individuals can invade a population of acepha-
lous individuals. This is because for a given group size,
hierarchical individuals are more likely to produce a surplus
than acephalous individuals on their patch (equation (2.2)).
Individuals that receive surplus resources then enjoy a fitness
increase, mediated by a reduction in the intensity of density-
dependent competition in their niche. Consequently, they
produce more offspring than individuals that do not receive
a surplus. In this way, when leaders increase the likelihood
of surplus generation, and share some of this surplus with
their followers, then hierarchical individuals can outcompete
acephalous individuals.
Crucially, this can occur even when leaders evolve to
retain a large proportion of the surplus for themselves
(figure 1c). This is because even when leaders retain some of
the surplus, followers can still each receivemore extra resource
than they would in acephalous groups, where the surplus
would be generated less frequently. This demonstrates the
voluntary creation of hierarchy, where individuals that
accept inequality in their groups are better off than those
that remain egalitarian. Whether or not this is the case
depends upon the magnitude of the advantage that leaders
confer in surplus generation.
Figure 1e,g illustrates the case where leaders do not pro-
vide much advantage in surplus generation. In this situation,
acephalous individuals each receive, on average, a larger
amount of surplus resources than followers of a leader. This
is because acephalous groups are almost as likely to generate
the surplus as hierarchal groups, but all of the surplus is
shared among themselves rather than some being retained by
a leader. Consequently, hierarchy is not favoured, and the
unconditional dispersal probability trait of acephalous individ-
uals, da, depends mainly on the dispersal cost and decreases
as the cost increases (figure 1e,g; further discussion in the
electronic supplementary material, appendix S1). We discuss
the conditional dispersal trait of followers, and its coevolution
with the proportion of surplus that leaders retain, below.
(b) The coevolution of group size and hierarchy
When individuals receive surplus resources, this leads to a
reduction in competition for resources with other individuals
on the patch in their niche. As a result, their niche can sup-
port a larger number of individuals (equations (2.3) and
(2.4)), leading to an increase in group size. Figure 1b,d illus-
trates that when hierarchy invades, it drives an increase in
group size. For example, in figure 1b, the population initially
starts out fixed for acephalous individuals, who produce
some surplus. This surplus drives an increase in their local
number from the base value of 20, to around 40. But because
of the problems of coordinating in large groups without a
leader (represented by a large value of gA), they are unable
to reliably generate the surplus in groups above this size.
Thus, their group size stabilizes around this value. However,
as hierarchy invades, group size increases up to 80 individ-
uals. This is because the coordination advantages of having
a leader (gH , gA) mean that hierarchical individuals are
able to continue generating the surplus in larger groups.
The increase in group size is driven by a positive feedback
loop in which surplus production increases carrying capacity,
causing an increase in group size, which then in turn allows
greater amounts of surplus to be generated. This positive
feedback loop stops when either (i) groups are too large for
additional surplus to be reliably generated (equation (2.2)), or
(ii) diminishing returns in the value of the surplus mean that
the extra surplus produced by one more individual is not
enough to increase carrying capacity by at least one individual
(equations (2.3) and (2.4)). When gH is smaller than gA, then the
feedback loop can stop at a larger group size for hierarchical
individuals than for acephalous individuals. Thus, the ability
of leaders to solve coordination problems in larger groups,
combined with the effects of surplus resources on demogra-
phy, means that the invasion of hierarchy produces a
transition to larger-scale social groups.
The transition to a larger group size is crucial to the stab-
ility of hierarchy. This is because acephalous individuals
experience density-dependent competition with hierarchical
individuals on their patch, and vice versa (equation (2.1)).
So the larger the absolute number of hierarchical individuals,
the more they suppress the fitness of acephalous individuals
by outcompeting them for shared resources, such as space.
Conversely, when there are few hierarchical individuals,
then it is relatively easy for acephalous individuals to rein-
vade and hierarchy to collapse. The parameter bk controls
the extent to which surplus production can increase group
size. As figure 2 shows, when this is low then although hier-
archy can invade, it does not remain stable. As bk increases,
however, then the invasion of hierarchy brings about a
large increase in group size that suppresses mutant acepha-
lous individuals. The transition to larger groups thus locks
individuals into hierarchy.
The degree to which group size increases when hierarchy
invades also depends upon how much of the surplus the
leader retains for itself. Specifically, when leaders evolve to
share more surplus resources with their followers, then the
group cangrow toa larger size (figure 1a,b, comparedwith 1c,d).
(c) When does cultural evolution lead to despotism?
What determines how much of the surplus the leader takes?
A selection pressure exists for a leader to take more of the
surplus, because this translates into an increased birth rate
rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org
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(equation (2.5)) and hence a greater number of offspring
relative to the other hierarchical individuals on its patch
(equation (2.1)). Moreover, because the leader of the next gen-
eration is chosen by random sampling of the offspring of
hierarchical individuals on the patch, this increased repro-
duction also increases the probability that one of the
current leader’s offspring will remain as leader in the next
generation. This continued occupancy of the leader role
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Figure 1. Illustration of ecological conditions under which either hierarchical (a–d ) or acephalous (e–h) individuals are favoured by the coevolution of culturally
transmitted behavioural traits with demography. When the presence of a leader confers a large advantage in surplus generation (gH much smaller than gA), then
individuals with a preference for hierarchy can invade an acephalous population (a,c). Successful generation of the surplus then drives an increase in population size
(b,d). The degree of despotism, measured by the amount of surplus the leader monopolizes for its own reproduction, increases with increasing dispersal cost (a,c).
Conversely, if the presence of a leader does not confer a large advantage in surplus generation, then hierarchy fails to invade (e–h), and groups remain acephalous.
Parameters: br ¼ 5, bk ¼ 100.
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then increases the reproductive share of the leader’s lineage
even further.
However, a pressure also exists for the leader to take less
surplus. This is because the total amount of surplus gener-
ated increases with increasing group size, which provides
an incentive for a leader to have more followers. But,
followers have a choice in leader because they may disperse
from the group and join a different one, conditional on the
amount of surplus that the leader takes (as given by their df
trait). Thus, if the leader takes too much of the surplus then
it will lose followers. This then means that less surplus
will be generated for hierarchical individuals in the next
generation, which can cause hierarchical individuals to be
outcompeted by acephalous individuals on their patch.
The proportion of surplus that the leader takes is therefore
a trade-off between opposing selection pressures. The balance
depends upon the cost of dispersal—how easily individuals
may leave one leader and follow another. If the cost of disper-
sal is low, then leaders are constrained in how much of the
surplus they can monopolize. This is because when dispersal
costs are low then followers evolve low tolerance values of df,
such that they readily disperse if leaders retain a larger pro-
portion of the surplus (figure 1a). Consequently, leaders
evolve to share a large fraction of the surplus with their
followers in order to prevent them from dispersing. On the
other hand, as dispersal cost increases, then followers
evolve larger tolerance values of df in order to avoid paying
a high dispersal cost (figure 1c). As a result, the strategy of
leaders coevolves to appropriate more of the surplus for
their own reproduction, because their followers will not
readily disperse to other groups.
Thus, in an ecology where dispersal is costly, evolution
leads to more despotic groups. Moreover, this increased des-
potism is voluntarily tolerated by followers, in the sense that
individuals which allow the leader to retain more surplus
before dispersing outcompete both acephalous individuals,
and followers that more readily disperse. Figure 3 demon-
strates this coevolution of follower dispersal preference and
leader strategy for the full range of dispersal costs.
bk = 20
bk = 70
bk = 200
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
generation
fre
qu
en
cy
 
o
f h
ie
ra
rc
hy
 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
tr
ai
t o
n 
a 
sin
gl
e 
pa
tc
h
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
fre
qu
en
cy
 
o
f h
ie
ra
rc
hy
 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
tr
ai
t o
n 
a 
sin
gl
e 
pa
tc
h
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
fre
qu
en
cy
 
o
f h
ie
ra
rc
hy
 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
tr
ai
t o
n 
a 
sin
gl
e 
pa
tc
h
Figure 2. Stable hierarchy requires that surplus resources translate into
demographic expansion of group size (large value of bk). Demographic
expansion removes the viability of the acephalous niche on a patch, locking
individuals into hierarchy. Panels show the stability of hierarchy on a single
patch in the metapopulation. Parameters: gA ¼ 0.15, br ¼ 2.
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Figure 3. As dispersal cost increases, followers tolerate their leader behaving
more despotically (a). This in turn means that they enjoy a smaller increase in
their carrying capacity, as the leader is able to direct more of the surplus into
increasing its own reproductive success relative to that of its followers (b).
Results show the long-run time averages over 3 $ 106 generations of the
stochastic simulation. Parameters: br ¼ 20, gA ¼ 0.15, bk ¼ 100.
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(d) Sensitivity to parameters and model assumptions
We systematically varied the advantage in surplus pro-
duction that leaders confer relative to acephalous groups
(gA). When leadership does not confer much advantage in
surplus production, then acephalous individuals outcompete
hierarchical individuals (electronic supplementary material,
figure S2). We also investigated the effect of varying the coer-
cive power of the leader (electronic supplementary material,
figure S3), as measured by the maximal birth rate advantage
it can enjoy from surplus production (br). As this increases,
then, for a given dispersal cost, leaders evolve to retain
more of the surplus for themselves. Further, we investigated
the effects of varying the intergenerational decay in surplus
resources, e, including allowing for complete decay (elec-
tronic supplementary material, appendix S2 and figure S4).
Finally, we allowed the offspring of a leader to disperse (elec-
tronic supplementary material, appendix S3 and figure S5).
We found that varying all of these does not qualitatively
affect our main results.
4. Discussion
We have presented a model that captures the dynamics of the
transition from small egalitarian to larger despotic groups. In
line with work by Hooper et al. [15], our model demonstrates
that hierarchical systems of social organization can be volun-
tarily created by followers, rather than having to be imposed
by a leader through coercion. This is in contrast to the current
trend in archaeology that focuses on ‘agency’, that is, on how
leaders promote their own interests at the expense of others.
By such accounts, leadership is seen as benefiting the leader
rather than the followers [4,6]. Yet, while it is certainly the
case that leaders should be expected to promote their own
ends, the agency of followers must also be considered
[1,28,36]. If leadership provides no benefit to followers, then it
is hard to see why previously egalitarian individuals would
accept despotic appropriation of resources, unless there were
coercive institutions such as a military already in place. But
such institutional coercion could not have been paid for
before a leader appropriated surplus resources, making it
hard to see how hierarchy could become established [16,26].
The origin of despotism in human societies is similar to the
problem addressed by reproductive skew theory [30]. In skew
models, despotism is measured in terms of how much of the
reproduction within a group is monopolized by a dominant
individual. This is constrained by the outside options that
subordinates have, either to live alone or in a different group.
Skew models predict that dominants should behave more des-
potically as the feasibility of outside options decreases [37].
However, they do not consider the benefits leaders can provide
to other groupmembers in terms of surplus production, and so
do not address how despotic leadership could evolve from an
initial stable state of egalitarianism.Here,we have extended the
basic logic of skew theory to incorporate the feedback between
surplus production and demography that was likely to have
been important during the Neolithic.
Previous work has explicitly modelled the formation
of institutions to solve various collective action problems
related to food production, as relevant to demographic
growth in the Neolithic [31]. It was shown that groups
could evolve institutionally coordinated punishment to
secure cooperation in generating surplus resources, driving
demographic expansion. This paper builds upon these results
by investigating the political ecology of such institutions, in
terms of the opportunities that they create for despotism as
group size increases.
Hooper et al. [15] showed that hierarchy can evolve if
leaders help to secure cooperation in the production of
large-scale public goods, using a model with complete dis-
persal between groups every generation. Their static
analysis implied that despotism should rise as the cost for fol-
lowers of switching to a different leader increases. Our model
has independently confirmed that this prediction holds in a
demographically realistic setting, where the cost of switching
leader is given a biological basis in terms of dispersal cost.
Moreover, our model incorporates dynamic group size along-
side explicit coevolution of leader despotism and follower
tolerances. This framework has allowed us to demonstrate
that the equilibrium of large groups with despotic leader-
ship can actually be reached by gradual evolution, from an
initial state of small egalitarian groups. Understanding the
dynamics of this transition is one of the most pressing
issues in Neolithic social evolution [16,26]. But previous
models have not addressed the interaction between subsis-
tence intensification, population size and dispersal costs.
Our results demonstrate that the interaction between these
factors provides a cogent explanation for the transition to
large and despotic groups. We now turn to discuss the
empirical evidence for this interaction during the Neolithic.
There is strong evidence that the presence of a leader con-
ferred advantages in solving coordination problems related to
food production in both complex hunter–gatherers [28,18,38]
and agriculturalists [21–23]. Arnold [17] stresses the role of
leaders in technological innovation that increased carrying
capacity. For example, the Chumash, a maritime culture in
the North American Pacific, developed large boats made of
rare materials, which required teams of specialists to construct.
Consequently, only high-status individuals could finance and
organize their construction. The boats greatly increased pro-
ductivity by allowing access to new marine resources, and by
increasing the amount of resource that could be transferred sim-
ultaneously. This increased carrying capacity [17], but also led
to increased stratification by providing surplus resources that
boat owners could monopolize.
There is also evidence that leaders coordinated the con-
struction of irrigation systems [21–23], even if not in the
state-building sense argued byWittfogel [20]. Spencer [22] pre-
sents archaeological evidence that the Purro´n Dam, an
irrigation system in prehispanic Mexico, was constructed by
a faction that aspired to leadership. Because canal irrigation
was essential for agriculture in this area, other individuals
would have benefitted from following this faction in order
to gain access to water [22]. Spencer presents evidence that
population growth subsequently occurred, causing the leader-
ship faction to coordinatemany followers in the construction of
a larger dam.Moreover, there is evidence that this expansion of
both population size and the irrigation system led to increased
social stratification, with elites beginning to trade surpluses
that they controlled for prestige goods [22]. This fits the
feedback between demographic expansion and hierarchy
formation captured by our model.
An important question is why despotic hierarchy evolved
under intensive food production, but not under hunting and
gathering? Our results suggest that demography plays an
important role in the stability of despotism. When groups are
rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org
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small, then hierarchy can easily collapse if despots take too
much resource. But if groups are larger, then density-depen-
dent competition means that hierarchical individuals can
outcompete acephalous individuals for shared resources,
even when despots retain most of the surplus. Demographic
expansion can therefore cause individuals to become locked
into hierarchy, by destroying the viability of a previous non-
hierarchical niche. Although human health appears to have
declined with the origin of agriculture [39], and agriculture
may initially have been less productive than hunter–gathering
[40], cemetery data strongly imply that a demographic expan-
sion indeed occurred during the Neolithic [8]. Other data
indicate that the population density of hunter–gatherer
groups is usually below 0.1 person per square mile, whereas
that of early dry farmers is around 4 persons per square mile,
and that of early irrigation farmers from 6 to 25 persons per
square mile [7]. The construction of irrigation systems, for
example, could thus trigger the coevolution of demographic
expansion and despotism.
Our model predicts that despotism should increase with
increasing dispersal costs, for which there is strong empirical
support [5,30,41]. Carneiro [41] presents evidence that state for-
mation (increased hierarchy) happens when relatively small
areas of productive agricultural land are surrounded by geo-
graphical barriers. This then allows leaders to extract tribute
from other individuals, whose options to leave the group are
limited. For example in Peru, early states evolved where
agriculture was practiced in narrow valleys, making dispersal
difficult. By contrast, states did not so readily evolve in the
Amazon basin where there were large expanses of agricultural
land available, making dispersal relatively easy [41]. Allen [5]
also stresses the role of dispersal costs in the creation of the des-
potic ancient Egyptian state. He argues that the deserts
bordering the Nile made dispersal very costly, thus allowing
the Pharaohs to extract a large surplus from agriculturalists.
Similarly, technological development can increase dispersal
costs. For example, irrigation farming was likely to tie agricul-
turalists to the irrigation system, again limiting free movement
and choice of leader [20,22].
In conclusion, our model predicts that despotic social
organization will evolve from an initial state of egalitarianism
when: (i) leaders generate surplus resources leading to
demographic expansion of their groups, which removes the
viability of an acephalous niche in the same area; and
(ii) high dispersal costs subsequently limit outside options
for followers by restricting choice of leader. The empirical
evidence reviewed here suggests that these conditions were
likely to have been satisfied during the Neolithic.
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